Abstracts
Symmetry and Hybrid Contingentism. in Higher-Order Metaphysics, eds. Peter Fritz and Nicholas K. Jones. OUP, forthcoming. (preprint)
This paper outlines a defense of hybrid contingentism: the view that it is contingent which individuals there are, but not contingent what properties there are. Critics pursue two main lines of concern. First, that the hybrid contingentist’s treatment of haecceitistic properties is metaphysically mysterious, and second, that hybrid contingentism involves an unjustified asymmetry in the associated modal logic. I suggest that in the setting of higher-order metaphysics these dismissals may be too quick. It is not at all obvious whether and to what extent we should expect particular ‘symmetries’ across the orders, and so whether — as Williamson (2013) argues — “the default preference is for a uniform metaphysics, on which being is contingent at all orders or none.”
This paper outlines a defense of hybrid contingentism: the view that it is contingent which individuals there are, but not contingent what properties there are. Critics pursue two main lines of concern. First, that the hybrid contingentist’s treatment of haecceitistic properties is metaphysically mysterious, and second, that hybrid contingentism involves an unjustified asymmetry in the associated modal logic. I suggest that in the setting of higher-order metaphysics these dismissals may be too quick. It is not at all obvious whether and to what extent we should expect particular ‘symmetries’ across the orders, and so whether — as Williamson (2013) argues — “the default preference is for a uniform metaphysics, on which being is contingent at all orders or none.”
Plenitude, Coincidence, and Humility. Philosophical Perspectives , 2022. doi: 10.1111/phpe.12161 (preprint with corrections)
I discuss a problem for the version of plenitude defended in Fairchild (2019) and propose an improvement. I argue that the plenitude-lover faces a choice point between aiming for humility (a principle that is compatible with any reasonable hypothesis about possibility and coincidence) and the ambitions of abundance characteristic of plenitude. Along the way, I draw out connections between an improved version of plenitude and other recent approaches to plenitude.
I discuss a problem for the version of plenitude defended in Fairchild (2019) and propose an improvement. I argue that the plenitude-lover faces a choice point between aiming for humility (a principle that is compatible with any reasonable hypothesis about possibility and coincidence) and the ambitions of abundance characteristic of plenitude. Along the way, I draw out connections between an improved version of plenitude and other recent approaches to plenitude.
Arbitrariness and The Long Road to Permissivism. Nous, 2022. doi: 10.1111/nous.12376
Radically permissive ontologies like mereological universalism and material plenitude are typically motivated by concerns about arbitrariness or anthropocentrism: it would be objectionably arbitrary, the thought goes, to countenance only those objects that we ordinarily take there to be. But despite the prevalence of this idea, it isn’t at all clear what it is for a theory to be “objectionably arbitrary,” or what follows from a commitment to avoiding arbitrariness in metaphysics. This paper aims to clarify both questions, and examines whether arguments from arbitrariness really are the proper foundations for one or both varieties of ontological permissivism. I argue that these considerations -- even when made more precise -- are far less successful at motivating radical forms of permissivism than we often take them to be. To do better, permissivists must either supply a much more developed metaphysics of material objects or a controversial (but tempting) conception of what we’re doing when we do metaphysics.
Radically permissive ontologies like mereological universalism and material plenitude are typically motivated by concerns about arbitrariness or anthropocentrism: it would be objectionably arbitrary, the thought goes, to countenance only those objects that we ordinarily take there to be. But despite the prevalence of this idea, it isn’t at all clear what it is for a theory to be “objectionably arbitrary,” or what follows from a commitment to avoiding arbitrariness in metaphysics. This paper aims to clarify both questions, and examines whether arguments from arbitrariness really are the proper foundations for one or both varieties of ontological permissivism. I argue that these considerations -- even when made more precise -- are far less successful at motivating radical forms of permissivism than we often take them to be. To do better, permissivists must either supply a much more developed metaphysics of material objects or a controversial (but tempting) conception of what we’re doing when we do metaphysics.
Varieties of Plenitude. Philosophy Compass, 15 (3), 2020. doi: 10.1111/phc3.12654
Material plenitude is the view that there is an abundance of coincident objects wherever there is any material object. This article explores a few places for puzzlement about plenitude; in particular, how we ought to motivate and formulate the target view. I'll suggest along the way that an investigation of plenitude is not merely of interest in its own right, but can provide valuable insights into abundant ontologies more generally.
Material plenitude is the view that there is an abundance of coincident objects wherever there is any material object. This article explores a few places for puzzlement about plenitude; in particular, how we ought to motivate and formulate the target view. I'll suggest along the way that an investigation of plenitude is not merely of interest in its own right, but can provide valuable insights into abundant ontologies more generally.
The Barest Flutter of the Smallest Leaf: Understanding Material Plenitude. The Philosophical Review, 128 (2): 143-178, 2019. doi: 10.1215/00318108-7374932
According to material plenitude, every material object coincides with an abundance of other material objects that differ in the properties they have essentially and accidentally. Although this kind of plenitude is becoming increasingly popular, it isn't clear how to make sense of the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way, reveals substantive constraints on the material world. In this article, I argue that any attempt to develop a coherent version of plenitude is subject to two under-appreciated challenges, and I develop a version of plenitude (global plenitude) capable of overcoming both. (Selected for inclusion in The Philosopher's Annual)
According to material plenitude, every material object coincides with an abundance of other material objects that differ in the properties they have essentially and accidentally. Although this kind of plenitude is becoming increasingly popular, it isn't clear how to make sense of the view beyond its slogan form. As I argue, it turns out to be extraordinarily difficult to do so: straightforward attempts are either inconsistent or fail to capture the target idea. Making progress requires us to engage in more delicate metaphysics than we might have expected and, along the way, reveals substantive constraints on the material world. In this article, I argue that any attempt to develop a coherent version of plenitude is subject to two under-appreciated challenges, and I develop a version of plenitude (global plenitude) capable of overcoming both. (Selected for inclusion in The Philosopher's Annual)
Against Conservatism in Metaphysics (with John Hawthorne). Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 82: 45-75, 2018. doi: 10.1017/s1358246118000103
In his recent book, Daniel Korman contrasts ontological conservatives with permissivists and eliminativists about ontology. Roughly speaking, conservatives admit the existence of ‘ordinary objects' like trees, dogs, and snowballs, but deny the existence of ‘extraordinary objects', like composites of trees and dogs. Eliminativists, on the other hand, deny many or all ordinary objects, while permissivists accept both ordinary and extraordinary objects. Our aim in this paper is to outline some of our reasons for being drawn to permissivism, as well as some of our misgivings about conservative metaphysics. In the first section, we discuss a tempting epistemic line of argument against conservatism. This isn’t a line of argument we find especially promising. Our most basic complaint against conservatism is not that conservatism has poor epistemic standing even if true, but instead that conservatism is weird. We develop this thought in the second part of the paper. In the final section we discuss some larger methodological issues about the project of ontology.
A Paradox of Matter and Form. Thought, 6:33-42, 2017. doi: 10.1002/tht3.230
In the face of the puzzles of material constitution, some philosophers have been moved to posit a distinction between an object's matter and its form. A familiar difficulty for contemporary hylomorphism is to say which properties are eligible as forms: for example, it seems that it would be intolerably arbitrary to say that being statue shaped is embodied by some material object, but that other complex shape properties aren't. Anti-arbitrariness concerns lead quickly to a plenitudinous ontology. The usual complaint is that the super-abundance of material objects is too extraordinary to accept, but I want to raise a different worry: I argue that the most natural way of developing this picture is already inconsistent. I show that a simple version of plenitudinous hylomorphism is subject to a Russellian argument, but argue that we cannot treat the problem straightforwardly as an instance of Russell's Paradox of Sets.
In the face of the puzzles of material constitution, some philosophers have been moved to posit a distinction between an object's matter and its form. A familiar difficulty for contemporary hylomorphism is to say which properties are eligible as forms: for example, it seems that it would be intolerably arbitrary to say that being statue shaped is embodied by some material object, but that other complex shape properties aren't. Anti-arbitrariness concerns lead quickly to a plenitudinous ontology. The usual complaint is that the super-abundance of material objects is too extraordinary to accept, but I want to raise a different worry: I argue that the most natural way of developing this picture is already inconsistent. I show that a simple version of plenitudinous hylomorphism is subject to a Russellian argument, but argue that we cannot treat the problem straightforwardly as an instance of Russell's Paradox of Sets.